

French Mission 10.539
Cdr. Meynier

5
The first step is to find out
your colleagues in the new system.

My dear Mayor Benson -

Thank you
for your letter
concerning Mayrises -

We are most
sorry we can't help
you and your
colleagues in any
way we are able -
Sincerely

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE
AUX ETATS-UNIS
WASHINGTON & O. C.

JNE/06/2

10 039A
French Mission
TELEPHONE DEPARTMENT 7100
1750 N. STREET

XGadaChine

July 27, 1944.

Brig. General W.J. Donovan, Director,
Office of Strategic Services
Administration Bldg.
28th & E St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

Dear General Donovan:

Following our conversation relative to MEYNIER, I have been advised by the French Navy Department in Algiers, that Meynier has been recalled to be given a command in the French Navy. I was also advised by Chungking that he is already on his way to North Africa.

I wish to thank you again for the kind attention you give to all French matters.

I beg to remain,

Very respectfully yours,

Jean Duvigneau
Major J. Duvigneau

20 March 1944

Handwritten notes:
✓ French Mission
✓ Mexican Commission
✓ J. V. Chavez

General de Brigada Mariano Carlos Legido
Comandante en Jefe
Alfaro, Milpante, Veracruz, Mexico
1920, 21 March, A. V.
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Legido:

I have your letter of 8 March 1944 in which
you inform me of the position of the Mexican
Government in regard to the situation in the
Caribbean Sea.

I am very glad to hear that the
Mexican Government is taking the necessary
steps to protect its interests in the
Caribbean Sea.

Since this agreement has been reached
and you will be able to take the necessary
steps in support of the United States
you will understand the importance of this
agreement for the United States. I am
sure that you will be able to take the
necessary steps to protect the interests of
the United States in the Caribbean Sea.

I am very glad to hear that the
Mexican Government is taking the necessary
steps to protect its interests in the
Caribbean Sea.

Very truly yours,
[Signature]

To: Mr. Donovan
Chief Clerk
 From: Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
 Subject: Communications from French

There are only really two to the General three points should be covered: (1) which would show that we regard Heynsier highly; (2) so that it is clear by we can have any bearing on the Chinese and that we will not be taken in; and (3) a closing paragraph which would show we have no alternative. The third suggestion is to have an answer to the Chinese foul we have not taken any action on a matter. Copy will, of course, be sent to the following: (1) Mr. J. H. Heynsier, (2) Mr. J. H. Heynsier, (3) Mr. J. H. Heynsier, (4) Mr. J. H. Heynsier, (5) Mr. J. H. Heynsier. I would appreciate a copy of the reply for my files.

Until the new factory building system is set up, I am in place in the plant, as with the various improvements.

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360006-9

MINISTERE MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE
 1175 STATE-UNIT
 WASHINGTON D. C.
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TELEPHONE CHARTER FOUR
 1755 N. STREET

March 2nd., 1944.

General de Brigade Aerienne Charles Euguet
 Commandant par Interim de la Mission Militaire Francaise aux E.U.

General W. Donovan
 Chief of Office of Strategic Services, Washington D.C.

My Dear General Donovan,

Following the communication that Major Hoffman of your Services had on March 1st, 1944, with Major M. Rivet of this Mission, I wish to confirm you the position of Capitaine de Corvette Regular, the Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who accompanied him to China.

The Mission of Capitaine de Corvette Mervier was organized with the agreement of your Services previous to the formation of the Comité Francaise de Liberation Nationale in Algiers. After the formation took charge of all affairs pertaining to France and its colonies, Capitaine de Corvette Mervier and his Officers and men were transferred on July 1st, 1943 to the French Military Mission in Chungking. The command of General Pechoff, the mission was placed under the name of the Committee de Liberation Nationale, and this mission was confirmed as authorized that your Services in both areas and in Chungking were confirmed.

As the late General Pechoff is deceased, I wish to confirm that Capitaine de Corvette Mervier, the Officers, non-commissioned officers and men who accompanied him to China, are under the French Military Mission in Chungking.

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

6 March 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: General Donovan
FROM: William A. Kimbel

I attach herewith copy of secret airmail despatch addressed to the Secretary of State by Ambassador Gauss, together with related letter addressed to Ambassador Gauss by Major General Hearn, Chief of Staff in Chungking. These documents were handed to me today by the Department of State as being of interest to you. They were transmitted by airmail which accounts for part of the delay in delivery.

WAK
William A. Kimbel

Attachments

Chungking, January 4, 1944.

Subject: Difficulties between OSS and French
Military Mission.

AIR MAIL

SECRET

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington 25, D.C.

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I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's despatch no. 1960, December 28, 1943, in regard to discussions between OSS and the French Military Mission at Washington and to enclose copy of a letter dated December 31, 1943, on this subject, from Major General Eburn, Chief of Staff to General Stilwell, written in reply to my letter to General Eburn of December 28 which formed enclosure no. 4 to the despatch under reference.

It will be noted from General Hearn's letter that this matter was recently discussed at General Stilwell's headquarters between the Chief of the French Military Mission and two OSS officers; that the French claimed a right of jurisdiction over the Haganah group was recognized by OSS; that Colonel Haganah expressed himself as satisfied; and, that in general, according to General Hearn, the matter of the group's cooperation with OSS has now been satisfactorily arranged between OSS and the French Mission.

[illegible]

Last Thursday, December 23, Colonel Hubiano told
 Lieutenant Colonel John Coughlin and Major Carl Hoffmann,
 both of U.S.A., at this headquarters. Colonel Hubiano
 told the Americans that he wanted members of the Moynier
 group and that he wanted members of them because he feared
 the Chinese domination of members of SAGG; he further
 stated that he had orders from Algiers to take over this
 group. Major Hoffmann assured him that as far as U.S.A.
 was concerned, he could command the Moynier group. He
 said the Americans were refraining from entering the political
 side of the picture in any way, and since his command
 over the Moynier group was a matter of French sovereignty,
 he could most certainly exercise that sovereignty. Major
 Hoffmann told Colonel Hubiano that he would remain in
 Algiers under the same as he was, and as far as U.S.A.
 was concerned, he could not see where lying and cheating
 by communications or otherwise, that we would like to have
 with the French in the future. He further said that the
 relations between the French and the U.S.A. were
 of course to those who were in the U.S.A. and the U.S.A. was
 better in that the U.S.A. was the only one who was in
 interest. Colonel Hubiano said that he was not
 going to mention the name of the U.S.A. in the future.
 Colonel Coughlin told Colonel Hubiano that he was not
 going to mention the name of the U.S.A. in the future.
 He said that he was not going to mention the name of the U.S.A. in the future.
 Colonel Coughlin said that he was not going to mention the name of the U.S.A. in the future.

For General Information, Please
See Your Nearest
Branch Office.

French Mission
Myers & Sons

6 March 1944

Rear Admiral Perwell, USN
Room 3056
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.

My dear Admiral Perwell:

Here is a copy of the letter received from the French Mission some weeks ago which indicates as I suggested some months ago that the National Committee of Liberation has assumed full control of this mission. It follows that we have no further responsibility in regard to Dupier.

Sincerely,

THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Enclosure

SECRET

6 March 1944

Mr. Edward S. Statistius
Acting Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

I am enclosing a copy of the letter
which I received from the French Military Mission
here in regard to Captain de Guerville Bayard
who, under our direction, had been for training
a unit of Indo-Chinese recruited in North Africa.

It is clear that the National Com-
mittee of Liberation has taken steps and there-
fore we are relieved of further responsibility.

Friend [unclear] to [unclear]
M. [unclear]
A. [unclear] [unclear]

To: Major Carl O. Hoffmann
FROM: Col. John W. Coulghin

Sub test: French Grod

I know that you are well aware of the French situation out here. It has not improved since you departed. Upon my return to Chungking I have heard so many conflicting statements that I decided to try and have an impartial investigation made of the whole affair. Lt. Devereux had been highly recommended by Lt. Hykes for the assistance he had given him, and since Commander Night agreed to place Devereux on temporary duty with OSS I decided that perhaps Devereux could go over the information available on the subject, meet those people concerned that are in Chungking, and write up the results. I am enclosing all of Devereux's writing. I don't feel that Devereux is, in any way, biased or that he is prejudiced. I think Devereux is, in fact, impartial and I don't think there is anything particularly new. However, it does all add up to a pretty hopeless situation.

I have had a couple of interviews with Hablens, under Devaux's interpretation and he has made charges that Devaux has not indicated. The primary one that interests me was that the information submitted by the Bernian group is exaggerated, is not factual, and as a result the reputation of the French Military Mission for authentic information is deteriorating. I know that is true for the 14th Air Force indicated to me that their information from the French was not too reliable. However, I do not know whether or not they were basing this on the result of a group submitted by the French Mission which had been obtained by some Bernian group. I have seen a couple of messages from the Bernian group containing information on convoys, giving the number of planes, place of departure, but not even to give the date, so that they could mean anything.

The following information was obtained from the records of the Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, regarding the land owned by the United States in the State of California:

The total land owned by the United States in the State of California is approximately 100,000,000 acres. This land is divided into several categories, including:

- Public Domain Land: Approximately 60,000,000 acres.
- Land Reserved for the Indians: Approximately 10,000,000 acres.
- Land Reserved for the National Forests: Approximately 20,000,000 acres.
- Land Reserved for the National Parks: Approximately 5,000,000 acres.
- Land Reserved for the National Monuments: Approximately 5,000,000 acres.

The land owned by the United States in the State of California is managed by the Bureau of Land Management, which is part of the Department of the Interior. The Bureau is responsible for the conservation and management of the land, and for the disposal of the land when it is no longer needed for public use.

...can hoping that Major Glass would arrive and that he
...However, I do not feel that I am justified in
...because the situation is such an unhealthy one.

Personally I doubt if anything can be accomplished with both
of them. I am concerned remaining out here. I think you understand
the situation. I don't know what the Kings are
doing. I think that it should be so arranged that we could
be involved, or could try.

...I then graduated the great rebellion ...
...the world ...
...I told him ...
...I certainly would not ...
...At 5:00 I ...
...business as ...

[illegible]

Lauching (Duchamp)
Feb 23, 1944

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The statement attached and submitted as a result of the interview with Mr. Col. Goughlin, to learn all that he could about the German case and then submit an opinion as to what should be done in order to secure the maximum contribution to the war effort. The Colonel stated that the existing reports to be sufficiently detailed to permit a recommendation.

I am inclosed the source of everything that he has said. Recommendations indicate the release of the material I have heard. This release is based upon the knowledge of the situation and on the basis of the information that is available.

Lauching (Duchamp)
Feb 23, 1944

Enclosure

1. Submarine 1000, French Navy.

Colonel Stanley A. Wilson.

He is a hot-headed and ambitious man. He is ambitious and she is ambitious. She is using his prestige as a rival here and he is using her prestige (or alleged prestige) in connection. He is known in the French Army for being disobedient and hot-headed. In many respects he is crude and naive.

* is the second most dangerous man in the group - second only to his wife in that respect.

... to a bad franchise. He has sold himself, out of ambition, to General Ted ...
... to certain cities. One might almost say that he has become a traitor.

Since he arrived in China relations between the French Military Mission and General Tai Li and Captain Miles have constantly deteriorated. Mignier has been most incoordinate and has lent himself to accusations against the French Military Mission.

After his arrival, he acted as a messenger from General Tai Id and Captain Miles to advise the Mission that Tai Id and Miles were prepared to conduct the military Mission. I consider that this was a form of blackmail extorted from General Tai Id and Captain Miles to make the Military Mission of Prince Sarr's Government. But we will not bow to them.

... is also increasingly intrigued against us (Francis Military Mission).

... that one of the reasons why he cannot work in that I have furnished
... military personnel and officials in Latin America. I have, however,
... some of my own group to have my own contacts. Now, in order to justify his
... reasons to contact even such persons (etc.) and who do not have
... as he is authorized by me to do.

... bringing the internationalization of business and of the group, of the setting
... indicating an example of change.

[illegible]

There are three people in this group. The first is a woman named Jane. The second is a man named John. The third is a man named James. The whole group is very small.

[illegible]

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

Lt. Cdr. MEYNIER (Continued, p.2)

Remarks of Lt. Duvieux to Captain Miles.

I respectfully solicit your approval to inform you of certain misgivings I have regarding the whole Meynier business. I do not know either Cdr. Meynier or Mrs. Meynier personally. I know well only Captain Ravol, Doctor Dijonnesau, Father Bec and a little, Lt. Coase, as well as sergeant Marcel. But I know Indochina and I am worried about my friend Bob Larson being mixed up with this. (See page devoted to Larson). I know the Annamites. This whole project is headed for a disaster and it will not work. Meynier may be a very gallant sailor, I hear that he has greatly distinguished himself in bringing out his submarine, but he does not understand politics in general and Indochinese politics in special. You cannot trust the Annamites. I predict the failure of the Meynier project without any knowledge of the leading personalities involved, simply because they approach the Indochina problem the wrong way. (Followed a brief discussion of Annamite society and of Annamite character.) The basic assumptions of the program are wrong. Captain Miles made no reply, but listened courteously to all my remarks.

LA 45: 133.

... opinion of Colonel Estabrook.

is a screaming and ambitious woman. She is intelligent indeed, but her intelligence is narrow in scope and is the typically vicious and plotting intelligence of the oriental, and of the female oriental at that.

He is the most dangerous person in the group.

Mr. Leake was married by his mother and she is the most influential person in the whole
community.

He is not hampered by scruples either as regards the goals which he pursues, nor as regards the means and ways to attain these goals.

She is a half-sister who had the good fortune to spring from an illustrious family which has rendered various important services to France. Col. Bellard has tried to investigate her claims that she is related to the Royal Family (i.e. the family of the Emperor of Mexico) by tracing through the Annals of Mexico, but has been unable to find anything definite on the subject. Col. Bellard has similar doubts as regards my client's relationship to the former Vice-Roy of Mexico's family.

As he related to the Excellency LE VAN CHIEU and to his Excellency NGUYEN TRONG HUU and both were somewhat disoriented now in London and seem to have very little influence. He also further has reports that our CHIEF seems to be the only person of standing, the dignity of Ambassador, and has this a kind of influence upon them. He also mentioned this rank and dignity. It should be noted that HUNG has had in fact some influence of this matter and that his information probably comes from this source.

she is known to be hostile to France. It must not be imagined, however, that she is
filled out of sentiments of loyalty and patriotism to the cause in which some anti-
social activities are anti-French. She uses the title of citizen for purposes of self-
protection. We must not step upon the glass of her family. In her eyes her family
and its social standing are more holy, to her, anti-French. In short, they are
the result of the recent and circumstances of anti-French.

[illegible]

1. The first of these is the fact that the Government has been unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out its policy of non-interference. This has been due to a variety of factors, including the fact that the Government has been unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out its policy of non-interference. This has been due to a variety of factors, including the fact that the Government has been unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out its policy of non-interference. This has been due to a variety of factors, including the fact that the Government has been unable to secure the necessary funds to carry out its policy of non-interference.

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them. The list includes names such as "Mr. J. H. Smith", "Mr. J. H. Jones", "Mr. J. H. Brown", "Mr. J. H. White", "Mr. J. H. Black", "Mr. J. H. Green", "Mr. J. H. Gray", "Mr. J. H. Blue", "Mr. J. H. Red", "Mr. J. H. Yellow", "Mr. J. H. Purple", "Mr. J. H. Pink", "Mr. J. H. Orange", "Mr. J. H. Silver", "Mr. J. H. Gold", "Mr. J. H. Bronze", "Mr. J. H. Copper", "Mr. J. H. Iron", "Mr. J. H. Steel", "Mr. J. H. Lead", "Mr. J. H. Zinc", "Mr. J. H. Nickel", "Mr. J. H. Tin", "Mr. J. H. Aluminum", "Mr. J. H. Magnesium", "Mr. J. H. Calcium", "Mr. J. H. Sodium", "Mr. J. H. Potassium", "Mr. J. H. Barium", "Mr. J. H. Strontium", "Mr. J. H. Rubidium", "Mr. J. H. Cesium", "Mr. J. H. Francium", "Mr. J. H. Radium", "Mr. J. H. Actinium", "Mr. J. H. Thorium", "Mr. J. H. Uranium", "Mr. J. H. Plutonium", "Mr. J. H. Neptunium", "Mr. J. H. Americium", "Mr. J. H. Curium", "Mr. J. H. Berkelium", "Mr. J. H. Californium", "Mr. J. H. Einsteinium", "Mr. J. H. Mendelevium", "Mr. J. H. Nobelium", "Mr. J. H. Lawrencium", "Mr. J. H. Rutherfordium", "Mr. J. H. Dubnium", "Mr. J. H. Seaborgium", "Mr. J. H. Bohrium", "Mr. J. H. Hassium", "Mr. J. H. Meitnerium", "Mr. J. H. Darmstadtium", "Mr. J. H. Roentgenium", "Mr. J. H. Copernicium", "Mr. J. H. Nihonium", "Mr. J. H. Flerovium", "Mr. J. H. Tennessine", "Mr. J. H. Oganesson".

ADDENDUM: MOST SECRET

MADAME REYNIER.

After securing Lt. Devereux's word of honor not to repeat this personally to Col. Coughlin, but offering to tell it personally to Col. Coughlin (which he did later in the afternoon) the following information was volunteered by Col. Rablanc:

- 1) Mrs. Meynier is NOT Mrs. Meynier. She and Lt. Commander Meynier are not married. Documentary proof of this is said to be available.
- 2) Col. Rablanc has received instructions from Algiers to keep Mrs. Meynier under surveillance as a dangerous person, hostile to France.

This information reached Col. Rablanc in a telegram from Algiers marked "SECRET". In self-justification he pointed out to Col. Coughlin that the telegram did not instruct him to keep this information from Col. Coughlin. It is simply a fact that the telegram is classified as "SECRET".

NOTE: It is believed that even if Lt. Devereux had not given his word of honor, Col. Rablanc would still have told him the story. The word of honor was given and kept - upon Col. Rablanc offering to tell it personally to Col. Coughlin, which he did as soon as Col. Coughlin came to see him, later in the day.

BEC, 2nd Lieutenant, French Army. (Catholic Missionary to Japan.)
 17 Comments of Col. Ambrose.

Father Bec is a great schemer and plotter of underhanded things. Question: You mean he is a schemer because all priests are trained in scheming? (See Note, next paragraph) Answer: No, it is more than that. He is a congenital schemer. He was born wicked.

NOTE: Be it remembered that in France there is a savage and bitter struggle between the progressive and anti-clerical Free Masons of the "Grand Orient" rite and the French. Ambrose is a Freemason.

He has seen nothing but trouble from the beginning to the end.

He is insubordinate. I sent him to Manning to get back some documents. When he got there he heard that Mr. Kotrla was coming up, so, in disregard of my orders he did not bring them back himself, but gave them to Kotrla, and, upon Major Bertin's orders, proceeded to Manning.

I have done all I could for him.

When he got here first, I was shortly thereafter in receipt of a wire from Algiers ordering me to send back Bec. I did not comply, thinking at that time that things would be fixed up. I told him I would wire Algiers to rescind that order. But after the flagrant act of disobedience regarding the bringing back of those documents, I felt that I had no reason to ask that that order should be rescinded. Still, I sent him a wire from Algiers to send father Bec back to Algiers. (I hereby order you formally and strictly) to send father Bec back to Algiers. Maynard wanted me to ask Algiers the reason for this order. (To Col. Coughlin) If you, Colonel, for example got a telegraphic order from the War Department, would you wire back to ask for reasons, or would you comply like a soldier? Obviously you would comply like a soldier. So I had to order father Bec back to Algiers.

But now there arise obstacles. I was warned a while back, when the very first order came through to send back father Bec, that the Chinese would place obstacles in the path of the execution of that order, and that in accord with Captain Riley, Hall, father Bec was to leave immediately this morning. Well, yesterday I had some rumors, and finally I got a notification from Tai Tai, Services that father Bec was not allowed to take the plane. This is directly an interference with the sovereign rights of France and I shall wire to Algiers to take the matter up at Washington, to stop this Chinese interference.

Also Bec has alienated from me two of my own officers. (NOTE: It is rumored that Lt. Colonel Gaudin and Roussin were meant). They are practically in open revolt against me.

18 Summary of a source closer to the situation.

19 Father Bec very much. He is plain and stark.

20 Summary of the situation at Father Bec's departure.
 The first source, who was in the office of the French Consul in Shanghai, told me that Father Bec was to leave for Algiers on the 10th of the month. He was to be accompanied by a French officer, and was to be given a special train. The second source, who was in the office of the French Consul in Shanghai, told me that Father Bec was to leave for Algiers on the 10th of the month. He was to be accompanied by a French officer, and was to be given a special train. The third source, who was in the office of the French Consul in Shanghai, told me that Father Bec was to leave for Algiers on the 10th of the month. He was to be accompanied by a French officer, and was to be given a special train.

... was reported to Col. Goughlin without delay, immediately after supper, instructions were issued for J.D. to stick to Father Bec for the rest of the evening. Bec and J.D. returned together to House No. 1. The first thing on entering House 1 in company with Cdr. Night was that the Commander inquired whether there had been a call from Edison Liu. There was none. I do not know whether Edison could not call back later on, after Bec's departure. be that as it may, Goughlin was advised officially the next day that Father Bec was not allowed to return.

... at whereas Mr. Night did not ask Edison Liu to prevent Father Bec's departure, and merely asked him to find out what Chang Kai Ki was up to, he cannot be said to have deliberately understate what was said, because I do not recall the words. Actually it was a pretty broad hint.)

My opinion.

By opinion.

After we had the first of the French group I ever met. I can say emphatically that I was delighted to see one of our French allies and that I was therefore more than willing to like him very much. I asked him to my room and talked with him late, last and the other (September 1943), and was rather shocked when I found that he was, all told, not very much out of sympathy with such phases of the Vichy program as did not constitute (a) direct help to the Germans, and (b) involve morality. On church, the youth-education, and many other allegedly "moral" and "national" angles, he sees eye to eye with the Vichy crowd. He is sensible and very understanding, but my esteem for him took a wholesale nosedive that very evening. (Though I was absolutely predisposed to like him, simply because he is French and wears the French uniform, figuratively speaking). As I got to know him more and more, my opinion of him grew worse and worse. He struck me, I do not know why, as a vulgar and straight-from-the-shoulder man with ulterior purposes. He has the frankness and directness of a bull. I have gained the impression that he was the stringpuller and the instigator of the Vichy crowd. I also saw that his influence upon Laval was considerable. I am satisfied that the refined and insipid distortions of many of the Vichy group's accusations against Col. Mathews are of Father X's making.

[illegible]

(cont. 3)

It should be further noted that every accusation against Col. Bahiano made by the French group (i.e. presumably by Father Bec) was never investigated. These accusations were simply believed and acted upon - but not investigated.

It is also noted in the preceding paragraph that Father Bec lied once, by suppressing the fact that Col. Bahiano, without reason, did not send a wire to Algiers, which he promised to send, to ask for a cancellation of the recall order.

Further, he once more suppressed a relevant fact: The fact that he was in the immediate vicinity of insubordination, as described above, in connection with the recall of Bahiano.

It is also noted that Col. Bahiano is faking telegrams. Formal proof of this would be insistently requested.

As regards Col. Bahiano's statement that Father Bec created dissension between himself and Lt. Colonel Condrais and himself, I can vouch for the fact that when I was with Father Bec at the Catholic Mission, he had hidden in his room where Colonel Condrais and would not let it. Does Vink know even that Condrais was there, and that he was in Father Bec's room. Not would he take me to the room where Father Bec was hiding.... From Col. Bahiano, and it should be noted that Father Bec knew (he said so) why Condrais was hiding. He would be a help without orders from, and without the knowledge of his superior, Lt. Colonel Bahiano. In other words, Father Bec was aiding and abetting an officer in rank insubordination. More will be said of this on a separate sheet, entitled "Condrais".

RECOMMENDATIONS:

It is recommended that we exercise every diligence to cause General Tai to be removed from the departure of Father Bec to Algiers, in compliance with formal orders from the French War Office in Algiers.

There is to have no business dealing in the internal affairs of France, it must be remembered that we are partly responsible for this event, through the fact that we (the least) General Tai to let him on General Tai's behalf.

It must be noted that Father Bec stated that he intervened in this matter, and that if he is called upon to account for this matter in Algiers, as he will be, he can say that the War Office was advised that he was in the matter, which would create a very serious situation.

It is also noted that this matter be discussed at once and the Father Bec be removed from Algiers. If the intervention (Mr.) Vink, known to be a most partial Frenchman, who was present and participated in the matter, would be removed from the matter - it would be all for the better.

1122 (continued, page 2).

Tai Li was never sympathetic to us, but the attitude of Captain Miles has made it over into overt hostility. Maynier went so far as to warn General Petchkoff that Tai Li had liquidated several of his former friends, and would therefore not hesitate to liquidate the officers of the French Military Mission if they strayed too far from Chongking. (A written report of this interview which contained equally fantastic remarks of Maynier to General Petchkoff was produced to Col. Coughlin and was translated to Col. Coughlin by Lt. Devartux).

(NOTE: It should be stated that Page 15 is full of such rumours. It is often said conversationally that if General Tai Li takes a dislike to you he will liquidate you by having you assassinated. I do not hesitate to say that some people really believe this and seem somewhat intimidated thereby. I have heard this rumour the first time in September 1943, immediately upon my arrival, and have heard it ever and over again since. G.D.)

1) Source close to the Maynier group.

Important Notice: This source is anti-Chinese and very strongly prejudiced and somewhat glib in making this remark.

Wentons is a little humiliated that he has to send us to get a permit for him from Captain Miles, even we can get everything from Captain Miles and he can get nothing. Petchkoff and Wentons only us the wholehearted support of the U.S. and of China.

2) Remark by Captain Miles:

Wentons is an old fox. (Followed one or two remarks in the same vein.)

LARSEN, a Lieutenant (SC) USNR.

Col. Devereaux's opinion:

Larsen is being led by his nose by Mrs. Maynier and the group.

as well as affair with Mrs. Maynier. "Let him burn his wings". (For details, see page dealing with Mrs. Maynier.)

A document disappeared for hours from Larsen's briefcase. Question: Do you mean that Mrs. Maynier took it? Answer: Yes.

Larsen means no harm. He just does not know the score.

Remarks at Fact 15.

a) Larsen is infatuated with Mrs. Maynier.

b) Larsen has an affair with Mrs. Maynier.

(NOTE: Lt. Devereaux pointed out to Col. Goughlin that whereas he had no information on the truth or falsity of this statement, it should be taken into consideration that a group of men deprived for months of any female company, even of the most proper nature, is obsessed with sexual matters. Since Larsen is the only one in the group having only association with an attractive woman, rumors of this nature would spring up, whether they be true or false.)

On his visit to Fact 15 from hearing Larsen was teased in public, at lunch, about this matter, and was asked in rather vulgar terms by someone (name not recalled) whether he had not been enjoying relations with Mrs. Maynier.

Additional information from a source close to the Maynier group.

As it goes on that Larsen has no idea about Mrs. Maynier sometimes makes fun of Larsen behind his back.

One page dealing with Mrs. Maynier for details of the scene that took place after she brought Mrs. Maynier Captain Kilg's presents for her meals and for various other ladies. These comments were conspicuous.

One also that these presents which are so disclosed were apparently secured at the suggestion of Lt. Larsen (and his date of November 16).

Remarks by Lt. Devereaux to Goughlin.

"I am very fond of this Larsen and I am worried about his being used by Mrs. Maynier. There is some one in the group who is trying to get him to go to the States. The group, all Americans, will drink when they go to the States and they will be very easy to control. I am very worried about this." (Note: This is a very serious matter.)

One also was quoted as saying that Mrs. Maynier, for reasons he is not sure of, is also very worried about this.

Barbier is a soldier of the 1890 vintage. He is not aware of any social or political change that has taken place in France in the last 40 years. He is a soldier and thinking out a soldier. He was brought up by an over-protective mother, his father having been killed in the last war. The Barbiers are an officer family. He was raised and indoctrinated at the Prytanee Militaire de St. Flourens (the equivalent of, let us say, an American military academy for young boys.) Then he went to St. Cyr, where he again learned only what he was taught, and that was just what any staff. Then he served under officers who did not bother to form their junior officers psycho- logically. He is very vain of his education, but he is completely blind and narrow in all military matters, he is naive in all these matters.

Question: You want to say that he is a post-soldier and if he were given orders to attack this I, he would say militarily correct plans to attack it and execute the attack, regardless of whether those men he attacks are the Blacks or strikers or others or anything? Answer: That is just what I do mean. He knows nothing in the world as far as that about anything except military matters.

is to be, the type of person for such activities must be intelligent, etc.

[illegible]

...and mention a very unpleasant incident with regard to the apprehended ...
...Martin pointed out that they were all ...
...and ...
...Martin ...

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DATE 10-10-2001 BY 60322 UCBAW

1. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, French Colonial Infantry.

2. Colonel of the 1st Cavalry.

3. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

4. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

5. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

6. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

7. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

8. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

9. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

10. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

11. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

12. Colonel, 1st Cavalry, Aljonnear and Gouva. I respect them and have a real

12. USCIB. French Army.

13. Entrance of Col. Hubert.

I have nothing against him and have a real regard for him.

Question: Would you care to have Captain Revol, Dr. Di Jonnean and Lt. Cosse
with you if the Kayler group is disbanded? Answer: No, an esprit de corps
at time to come into being.

14. Entrance of the Kayler group.

I do not care for Cosse. He is just like the rest, except Captain Revol. He is
gross and uneducated and narrow and stupid, but there is no real harm in him.
He just gets on my nerves. He is an overgrown egg.

As to whether to have had an affair with these soldiers in Germany

15. By speaker.

I saw Lt. Cosse only once, at Mainz. He seemed a nice guy, with emphasis on the
word "seemed".

COUDRAIS, Lt. Col. French Army.

1. Col. Enlano's opinion.

Father Bee has seen two officers under my orders to be practically in open mutiny. No names were mentioned, but it is obvious that Col. Coudrais and Col. Enlano were among them.)

2. Statements by Father Bee

Col. Coudrais is a fine man. He is short at the age-limit and has no ambition to become a full Colonel or a General before retiring.

(Explaining why he was entertaining Lt. Doan Vinh in Father Brun's room, instead of in his own, why he could not take me to his room, and why no one replied when we myself and another priest) knocked on Father Bee's door: "Colonel Coudrais is in hiding. He does not wish it to be known that he is here. He is supposed to leave tomorrow morning by plane, on a trip".

Statements to Col. Coudrais (by Bee).

Enlano's behavior toward Coudrais is extraordinary. Yesterday two Chinese came to see Enlano Coudrais about the hour the plane was to leave. This morning Coudrais pointed and left with Lt. Col. Enlano. Only Enlano's cap was seen. This was observed by Col. Enlano, as was the fact that Coudrais' baggage was missing. He thereupon sent a formal letter to Enlano as follows:

- "I absolutely order you (as was usual) to state:
- a) Who were the two Chinese who came to see Coudrais yesterday?
 - b) What was their business?
 - c) Where is Col. Coudrais going?

NOTE: Observe that apparently Col. Enlano was not advised of the prospecting trip of one of his subordinates and knew nothing about it.

Conversation between Enlano and Mr. Wright (Interpreter G.D.)

Wright: "Father Bee, has Coudrais left on that little trip we talked about?"
 Enlano: "Yes. He is supposed to leave today or tomorrow."
 (Apparently an effort was made not to let the interpreter in on the nature of the trip.) Father Bee briefly repeated the story he told already to Col. Coudrais. It eventually came out that the trip was to Seattle.

Comments:

1) Coudrais is Enlano's subordinate. He is going on secret trips around between himself and the Joint Group, without letting his commanding officer know about it.

2) The journey went as far as to leaving the house of the Military School, and ending out on the Catholic Mission, with the help of Father Bee.

3) The nature of this trip was not mentioned by Enlano, but it was clear to investigate the serious business the Col. Coudrais was doing.

Personal Observations:

1) I do not know Col. Coudrais. I am assuming that he is a subordinate of Enlano. I am not sure about this, but I am assuming that he is a subordinate of Enlano.

2) The Father Bee has decided to get some more information about the trip. He has already found by accident that some other subordinate of Enlano was going on the same trip. He is now trying to get more information about the trip.

MRS. ABLEMAN and FATHER BOE.

1) Statements by Father Boe:

Question: What kind of a woman is Mrs. Ableman.

Answer: She is a whore. (Gree) (A vulgar word, which, coming from a priest, is rather peculiar.)

Question: Does Col. Ableman know about these infidelities and what does he do about it?

Answer: Oh, it makes no difference to him. He has his own adventures on the side. Question: Doesn't it mean anything to him?

Answer: I guess not. I guess she was a whore before he married her and he may have married her straight out of a whorehouse.

2) Mrs. Ableman's activities at Lansing.

According to Father Boe:

(a) She distorted certain statements of his, thus creating ill-will between himself and Col. Ableman.

(b) She had affairs there.

(c) She annoyed non-Grullist people in many ways. "and they were very respectable and distinguished people. One of them, the director of the Bureau of War and another a director of the Bureau of Intelligence. One of them is a general veteran of the last war, a very fine person, a member of the Legion."

Question: What Legion? The Federal Legion or the Foreign Legion?

Answer: The Federal Legion.

(NOTE: On hearing of the Legion of the Foreign Government, I was distinguished for being, among other things, a Federal Legionnaire, which is the equivalent for a member. It shows exactly where Father Boe stands politically.)

NOTE: NONE OF THESE WOMEN HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED BY NAME - They were just told what I heard I heard that rumor in this form the way to Lansing is through Mrs. Ableman. The way to Mrs. Ableman is through her maid.

10. TRAIL:

Father Boe objects to the fact that Mrs. Ableman is in charge of the post office. He not only doesn't like her, but also tells her husband that she is a whore.

Father Boe also objects to the fact that Mrs. Boe is in charge of the post office and secret correspondence. He says she is a whore and tells her husband that she is a whore. He also says she is a whore and tells her husband that she is a whore. He also says she is a whore and tells her husband that she is a whore.

IN 1947 THE CHIEF OF OFFICE OF THE FBI, NEW YORK, TOLD THAT FATHER BOE, A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, WAS A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, WAS A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, WAS A MEMBER OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Colonel EMBLANC:

- (a) Complete cooperation for a trial period of three months following the suppression of the Maynier problem. I am satisfied that he knows Indochina thoroughly. (I base this statement on the fact that I have specialized in the study of Indochina since 1933). I THINK he has the proper connections. Among his assistants Captain Hans Imfeld, French Army (Colonial Infantry) also knows Indochina thoroughly.
- (b) He ought to be reassured that OSS is not against him.
- (c) Efforts should be made to cause the Chinese to suppress the more overt acts of their hostility. Perhaps we could secure permission for him to operate his radio station.
- (d) Lt. Devereux should be designated to do liaison.
- (e) Envisage the possibility, after three months, IF EMBLANC DELIVERS THE GOODS IN THE THAI BUSINESS AND OTHERWISE, of organizing an intelligence school for Indochinese native agents.
- (f) If after three months Emblanc fails to deliver the goods, try to have him recalled by Algiers.

NOTE: Only if the Maynier group is out of the way, and the Chinese cease to harass him will the test be fair.

2) COMMANDER AND MRS. MAYNIER.

Best Approach: Immediate return to Algiers.

Second Best Approach: Send an OSS officer who knows Indochina thoroughly and speaks excellent French (e.g. Major Glass or Lt. Devereux) to Nanning, to insure liaison. Make it clear that Maynier must cease (a) Heckling Emblanc. (b) Play the Americans and Chinese against him. Make it clear that if they do not deliver the goods in 3 months, the project is off. Get Emblanc to cooperate for three months, and check on the wholeheartedness of this collaboration.

The American officer must use the iron hand in the velvet glove. Things have gone too far. He should lean on Captain Revol and Doctor Dijonnesse. It must be made clear to Maynier that international courtesy makes it imperative that we recognize the existence and rights of the French Military Mission and that Emblanc, in our eyes, is his superior officer. Watch out for possibility of Maynier being used by halfhearted people in Indochina to safeguard themselves by minor help to Maynier against punishment as quislings after the war.

If this works well, let Emblanc concentrate on the de Gaulle element, and Maynier on the Vichy element in Indochina. If not, Maynier must go.

3) MERTIN, REVOL, BLANCKE:

If Maynier goes, in order to save the face of the Chinese and of Laos, try to persuade Emblanc to keep these three. Force the Chinese, in exchange for this face-saving, to give Emblanc help (provided Emblanc has in the meantime delivered the goods.)

4) LARSEN.

Return Larsen immediately to Laos. FRANK: Maynier is OSS. He should not in any way seem in disgrace. He did his best in a job for which he was not fitted, and to which he was appointed. It is not his fault that he was given that job.

6) SEC:

Remove Sec immediately to Algiers. This is imperative. Unfortunately (from the etical point of view) it is not possible to remove him in disgrace. He is a priest and it would irritate the French clergy in Indochina. In the interest of international harmony it is desirable that since the U.S., through some of its officers, is involved in the matter of his delayed departure, we should put pressure on the Chinese to let him go.

6) ANNAMITE PERSONNEL:

Should be recalled from Nanning and returned to the French Military Mission. They are useless and cannot be trusted, with the possible exception of the old Master Sergeant (Adjutant) and of Sergeant Marcel, a half-caste and an educated man. (Marcel wishes to go to Massachusetts Institute of Technology after the war. He studied at the Sorbonne.) The mission could use them.

7) IF ALL WORKS WELL:

Organize intelligence school for natives of Indochina and French, and sabotage schools ditto.
Use French and Indochinese personnel, so far as possible, for intelligence work in Indochina, and for sabotage ditto. American supervision should be obtained in exchange for schooling and materiel. Their status should be "MEMBERS OF THE FRENCH DEUXIEME BUREAU, ON LOAN TO OSS." (to safeguard all sensibilities, always an important factor among the French.)

8) THE CHINESE ANGLES:

The Chinese should, as far as possible, be kept on the sidelines. The French believe that the Chinese have designs on Tonkin and if the Chinese are mixed up with it, the French might think America is backing Chinese claims on Tonkin. Let the Chinese do their own Indochina intelligence.

9) AMERICAN SUPERVISION:

Under the authority of Colonel Coughlin a U.S. officer should be put in charge of all matters pertaining to US-French intelligence liaison, and SACO-FRENCH GOVERNMENT liaison. Its task is to train workers, and provide materiel, in exchange for supervision, control and information. The whole thing, if suitably balanced and delicate, can amount to virtual direction and yet safeguard all sensibilities.
We might consider a secondary intelligence network among the halfhearted or the fanatically anti-De Gaulle. Care must be taken not to get involved there in political or post-war commitments.

10) GENERAL APPROACH:

- 1) NOW: Sweep up the debris ruthlessly and once and for all.
- 2) ON THE LONG RUN: a delicately balanced system of controls, which must be military in nature and free from any political taint, either pro De Gaulle or pro Hiroshi, or anti the two. Take the line: Our job is to win the war.

INTERVIEW WITH A SOURCE CLOSE TO THE MEYNIER GROUP.

Source was advised at this juncture that interviewer was investigating the Meynier group. It should be noted that all statements made by him were fully in line with what he had said previously.

EMBLANC

Informant does not like him. He grants, however, that he is genuinely patriotic and not a mere opportunist like Meynier. He thinks he is devious and complicated, and would like to have him sent back to Algiers quite as much, or perhaps even a little more than he would like to see Meynier sent back. He says that ~~May~~ Emlanc falsified telegrams, etc. but on close cross-questioning admits that this is hearsay evidence, from Major Bertin and Father Bec. In fact all that he "knows" against Emlanc is hearsay from Meynier-group sources. He does not deny that Emlanc has good connections in Indochina.

MADAME EMBLANC

Informant says she had an affair with a Captain Bonnet, and not with Lieutenant Gasse. He ignores whether this is known to Col. Emlanc. She is believed to have annoyed Missionaries and non-partisan French at Huuming. This too he knows only from hearsay, but believes it. (It should be noted that at least one of these "non-partisan people" is known to be a Petain Legionnaire, according to Father Bec himself.)

LT. COMMANDER MEYNIER

He is an opportunist. He is a braggart who has magnified the social status of his wife until now he himself believes it. He has no valuable contacts in Indochina. (Cf. section on Mrs. Meynier's family). He should absolutely be sent back to Algiers. Mrs. Meynier is not his wife. He was married and had three children by a Frenchwoman. Then apparently (he is not sure of this) the alleged Mrs. Meynier enamored him and he left his wife and asked for divorce after the debacle of France. This was not easy to obtain under the Petain regime, so he left his wife and children and lived with Mrs. Meynier so-called. After he got to Algiers he got the French Intelligence to get his wife out of France. They agreed and by misadventure contacted the REAL Mrs. Meynier, and were compelled to report to Algiers that she had no intention of joining her husband. Then he had to confess that he meant the "other" Mrs. Meynier. French Intelligence was disgusted and said they'd be "damned" before the risk people's lives to rescue a mere concubine. After the alleged Mrs. Meynier was gotten out of France by other means, she was not very well received by the French Navy. Circled in Algiers, the French Navy being rather stodgy in that respect. He is a very ambitious man. He has no idea how to do intelligence. He is coasting off American and Chinese support and has mounted a conspiracy against Emlanc. (He is remembered that informant sorely dislikes Emlanc too. Where this statement is reliable.) Well, Emlanc is hard to get along with and Emlanc envies him his American support and American state of mind etc. He also tried to get Meynier to be under himself and General Petainier. But Meynier played the Americans and the Chinese against Emlanc. Informant talked a lot about the nature of Meynier's influence. He talked back and forth and finally interviewer put it to him in these terms: "What you are trying to tell us seems to be that Meynier's influence with the Chinese and the Americans seems to rest on their conception that he has influence in Indochina, and his influence in Indochina rests upon the conception that he has influence with the Chinese and the American." Informant would not like to be this formulation, perhaps because it was very blunt, but that is all the sense that his blarney and indirect statements amounted to in my opinion. Meynier's acceptability, from the Chinese viewpoint is that he is a Frenchman of the yellow race and that shows that he has no influence in Indochina.

(IMPORTANT NOTICE: I cannot, without revealing informant's name and background, explain why no importance should be attached to this last statement. It is something which expresses not a fact, but rather a personal preoccupation of the informant.)

Commander Maynier views the future of Indochina as follows: Dominion status, local autonomy, with the Governor General and some French officials acting in a supervising capacity only. In brief: Indochina governed by the Indochinese, and the native government controlled for honesty, etc. by the French. These are also the views of Madame Maynier. Some vague hints were thrown out about Maynier not thinking it impossible that he might become the president of Indochina. People in the Maynier group like neither Maynier nor Mrs. Maynier.

MADAME MAYNIER (so-called).

For her real status of concubine, see above paragraph, concerning Commander Maynier.

The problem of possible infidelities: Informant knows nothing definite. On close questioning this transpired: While still in France she wrote to a woman friend a rather harsh letter about Maynier. This woman friend showed the letter to Maynier, who has thought that it meant she was getting interested in someone else. On the eve of her arrival in Algiers he even said "I shall scold her well". (Je la savonnerai bien). As regards any infidelities here, he knows nothing, not even rumors. On being asked if anyone was infatuated with her, he suggested that perhaps quite a few people were, and suggested that one had to look to the American side for that. Nothing further could be obtained.

Informant recommends that she too be sent back to Algiers. He holds that her influence is not very important. See next paragraph. Regarding her patriotism: She is not anti-French. She is pro-Indochina, not ~~anti-French~~. because she is nationalistic, but out of ambition. But she cannot be called a good Frenchwoman by any means. She and her husband are both ambitious. She uses his military glory and her family status.

FAMILY OF MADAME MAYNIER.

The influence of Madame Maynier's family has been grossly exaggerated, especially by Commander Maynier, who is even more vain about it than she is. Being a vainglorious, he has talked about it until he himself believes it. The plain fact is that her famous uncle is not a man of great caliber, and that his influence is not the influence of the man, but of the great wealth of the man. Also his influence touches only the older generation, and the old-fashioned people at court (him), but not the up and coming people. All in all, it does not amount to very much.

The business about the Throne of Tonkin was broached at a dinner in a jocular manner by General M. She replied to it laughingly, but the idea is not one which strikes her as preposterous, by any means. The "Throne" is actually the hierarchy of Tonkin, which used to be quasi-independent and quasi sovereign until the uncle is quoted, in exchange for the Grand Order of the Legion of Honor, voted it to the Governor General of Indochina. Now she would like to get the hierarchy back for herself or her family. IMPORTANT NOTE: These slighting remarks about the influence of Mrs. Maynier's family are consistent to your most serious attention, for reasons which I can not discuss fully, because they would reveal the identity of the informant. Coming from him they are of great value indeed.

MADAME MAYNIER:

It is correct that he is only a soldier and nothing else, but he is honest, though it cannot be said that he is entirely disinterested in his position.

CAPTAIN REVEL.
 Revel, DeJondeau and Gause (the latter doubtful) are the only disinterested people. Revel joined from a spirit of adventure. He is a fine man and an honest man. Perhaps he has no especially broad culture (Informant's notion of what broad culture means is: literary erudition of a very high order.) but he is intelligent and cultured and very patriotic and square.
 A letter from Revel was produced in which Revel stated over and over again that the situation and the setup at Manning "nauseated" him (ecceure) and that informant was far better off at Chungking than at Manning. Everything at Manning was "vanity, pride, conceit, and fear of responsibility". "Manning is full of fear of responsibility, or even of fear, period." (pour tout court.) I did not obtain permission to copy the letter. It was a sad and bitter letter indeed. It suggests that Revel feels that the whole situation at Manning is a mess. Note the number of synonyms used "vanite, orgueil" and other.

He is OK and disinterested. An honest man.

~~RE: FRANK CASH~~
He is just a boy, and probably disinterested. Lacks caliber.

CAPTAIN ROUSSET
He is a "-----". He figured that Bablens had the upper hand and went over to him and is now at Longbow. He has caused trouble with Siguret and everyone else and is generally no good. He is crooked. Completely unreliable.

FATHER MUR-
A hard and vindictive man. If you do something against him, he will get you for it. He has a lot of influence in the Maynier group and hates Reblanc. More contacts were made along the same lines.
Question: How does Father Mac regard his status as a Catholic priest with living with and taking the wife up for a man and a woman living in adultery? and why does the Bishop receive them? Answer: He can't come do no marriages (and why does the Bishop receive them? Answer: He can't come do no marriages (they are presumed not to know it). In fact they do know it, in fact a Catholic priest is made that they (altery) do not know it, though they do know it. This way their clerical character can be preserved.

[illegible]

LIEUTENANT LARSON:

He is a nice chap. It was a great mistake attaching him to the Meynier group. He is not French and does not catch the meaning of subtle things that go back and forth. It takes a Frenchman to understand the undercurrents of that group. Even you understand it only, despite your many years in France, because I have told you so many of the things that happened when no American was present.

NOTE ON THE BEC AFFAIR.

The antecedents of obstacles to Father Bec's departure are listed in the main report, under "FATHER BEC", up to and including his visit to Post 15. The next day Col. Coughlin and Lt. Devereux went to visit Col. Emlanc and Col. Coughlin mentioned that (NOTE: The wording is extremely important precise in what follows, and is conceded to be correct by Col. Coughlin, Lt. Col. Emlanc, Lt. Devereux and Lt. Soriano, French Army): "FATHER BEC SAID TO ME YESTERDAY THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE MIGHT ARISE OBSTACLES TO HIS DEPARTURE." This is all.

The next day Col. Coughlin received a letter from Father Bec, saying that he was confined to quarters for 15 days by Col. Emlanc, and quoted verbatim the order of punishment. He was punished "For having communicated to the chief of an allied service the fact that he had been secretly advised by a member of an allied service that obstacles would be put in the path of his departure."

Next

The letter also contained quotations of what Emlanc is alleged to have said to Father Bec in connection with Col. Coughlin, and Father Bec seemed rather bitter about having been "let down" by the Americans. (The letter was carefully translated and annotated by Lt. Devereux. It is appended.)

Next day Col. Coughlin and Lt. Devereux called on Col. Emlanc and Col. Coughlin said he wished to check on whether he was correctly quoted. Col. Emlanc said he did not misquote Col. Coughlin and that the inference he made was fully justified by his being officially advised by the Chinese that Bec would not be allowed to leave. Col. Coughlin said the question was not what Col. Emlanc inferred, but what Col. Coughlin said, and it was agreed to produce Father Bec in the afternoon for an interview. Emlanc offered at once to rescind the punishment, but Col. Coughlin insisted he refused to mix with the punishment in any way, and it was the same to him whether Father Bec was freed or shot. All he wanted to make sure he was correctly quoted, because he did not wish to get the reputation of carrying tales. He said that all he cared for was to see the work being done, and the war going ahead successfully. Emlanc said that he felt the same way. He asked what Emlanc's motivations had taken up much of his time which could have been more usefully devoted to the war. It was agreed to produce Father Bec in the afternoon.

In the afternoon Lt. Devereux arrived ahead of everyone, and Father Bec came in. I might say he looked sulky and had the air of a martyr. Col. Emlanc asked him: "Father Bec, what is this request you made to me?" Bec: "I asked for permission for the military chaplain to visit me, since I am a prisoner." Emlanc: "Will you consent have him. You are confined to quarters, but not a prisoner. You have no work right. I know your regulations. You are punished, but you have not been sentenced by law for any crime. You received an infamous punishment. All you are trying to do is play the holy martyr. You are good at that." (NOTE: The above is the essence of the conversation. Bec was quite angry and was obviously trying to get Emlanc's goat with this request, made at a time when he had been in confinement less than 24 hours.)

Then Col. Coughlin: "Now the conversation was almost identical with the one reported above as taking place between Col. Emlanc and Col. Coughlin. Col. Emlanc reiterated the position of his own free will. He said he was not taking a personal attitude in the matter." Bec's defense was highly technical. He argued that he did not go behind the Americans, but was asked by Col. Coughlin to see him. Which is correct. He probably accepted Col. Coughlin's very technical statement of what Bec had actually said. During the interview with Coughlin, Emlanc said that he definitely did not believe that he had implied the whole story to Lt. Devereux and to Commander Hill.

There was an incredible change of story between Emlanc and Bec. Emlanc represented Bec for his whole sentence, perhaps during, and perhaps he acted in doing so before allied officials. His Bec's regular was also as I never doubted of hearing a similar official story to a man in uniform. They were in fact that I thought he was a man. But Emlanc was not that man and Bec.

One bit of it stuck in my mind, and being the highlight of the argument. Eblanc: "Then I quote Col. Coughlin: 'You are very good (accustomed to) and you are simply taking my pitch from me.' I am a liaison to la maison." Eblanc: "He house lies."

He was insolent also, for this remark was a direct insult to the house and might hit him. Eblanc: "He house lies."

Another exchange of remarks: Eblanc: "He is 70 years old and a priest. I ask to be treated with all the respect due to you." Eblanc: "He is 70 years old and a priest. I ask to be treated with all the respect due to you." Eblanc: "He is 70 years old and a priest. I ask to be treated with all the respect due to you."

That was that.

There was a scandal in Rome. Everything was in a state of confusion. Eblanc: "He is 70 years old and a priest. I ask to be treated with all the respect due to you."

Discipline is severe in the French army. Personal passions might shed some light on the situation.

If my superior officer of equivalent seniority (C.O.) was in a position to report me under the same circumstances and in the same manner, I would make a formal complaint. After that I would strictly hold my tongue and stand to attention. After that I would bring a complaint through regular channels.

At that time, I was a Lieutenant Colonel, and a C.O. at that, and if a second Lieutenant was to be court-martialed, broken and killed.

My father was very skillfully needed Col. Eblanc and was apparently trying to get him out of something irreparable before Co. Coughlin.

THE MERITS OF THE SITUATION.

(a) Bee's defense was purely technical and hairsplitting. It would stand up in court of law, but does not stand up ethically. NOTE THIS: Col. Coughlin gave Col. Eblanc a very much toned down version of what Bee actually said, though an entirely truthful one. BEE WAS VERY CAREFUL TO CALL ONLY COL. COUGHLIN AS A WITNESS AND TO BRING ONLY COL. COUGHLIN, and never mention the fact that he was asked, he spilled everything to Lt. Devereux. In fact, and without as it is technically correct that the text of his punishment order carried in saying that he had spilled the beans to a chief of an allied organization (by inference Col. Coughlin) whereas he spilled it to Devereux and to the Executive Officer of another U.S. organization, Cdr. Wight, the fact remains that HE DID NOT INFORM EBLANC OF THE WARNING HE HAD RECEIVED, NOR OF THE FACT THAT CDR. WIGHT HAD KNOWN EDISON LEE (AS STATED IN THE MAIN DOCUMENT.) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT HE KNEW THAT CDR. WIGHT TELEPHONED, HAVING BEEN PRESENT, WHEN THAT IT WAS ABOUT 170, JONCE DEVEREUX, WRIGHT, TRANSLATED IT TO HIM, AND HAD TO AND HER ASSORTED DETAILS OF CDR. WIGHT'S BEHALF. In brief, as regards the defense: He did not spill it to the "chief" of an allied organization, but to other officers of that group, and knew of an intervention by one of them. He furthermore knew of facts which he was in duty bound to report at once to his commanding officer. This fact he carefully suppressed and insisted that he felt no concern that he would leave that he packed (conceded by Eblanc) and sent greetings to people. In our presence at least he carefully managed to avoid stating that he knew and had been warned. He conceded he had suspicions, but just barely. Thinking what he told us (Devereux) and Cdr. Wight, I call this in mind of one of the "lies" which may stand up in court of law, but not before a tribunal. Coming from a priest,....

personally, I found Bee's advice is this matter interesting, neither more nor less.

24

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/26 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100360006-9

was bit of it stuck in my mind, and I am reporting it almost verbatim, as being the highlight of the argument: Emblanc: "When I quoted Col. Coughlin to you, you said he lied if he said that. You are very good (accustomed to) calling everyone a liar." Bec: "I am simply taking my pitch from the tuning fork of the house" (Je me mets au diapason de la maison." Implication: (a) I do so because everyone in the house lies.

I got called insolent etc. for this remark by Emblanc. This is the moment when I thought Emblanc might hit him. Emblanc was red in the face. Another exchange of remarks:

Bec: I am 40 years old and a priest. I ask to be respected.

Emblanc: I give you all the respect due to you.

Bec, on being told that the punishment was cancelled, insisted that he wanted to serve his punishment out, so Emblanc told him he could not serve it and that was that.

I repeat, it was a tremendous scene. Everything went so fast that only bits stuck in my mind, because I just watched the scene, wondering all along what would happen. (Blood, like is severe in the French Army.)

Perhaps my personal variations might shed some light on the discussion.

I thought:

(a) If my superior officer of equivalent seniority (e.g. a Navy Captain or a Colonel), reprimanded me under the same circumstances and in the same manner, I would state that he was violating military courtesy and that I would make a formal complaint. After that I would strictly hold my tongue, and stand to attention. After that I would bring a complaint through regular channels.

(b) If I were a Lieutenant Colonel, and a C.O. at that, and if a second Lieutenant spoke to me like that, I would have the man court-martialled, broken and put in prison.

I might add that either the very skillfully needled Col. Emblanc was apparently trying to get him to do something irreparable before Col. Coughlin.

THE RESULT OF THE SITUATION.

(a) Bec's defense was purely technical and hairsplitting. It would stand up in court of law, but does not stand up ethically. NOTE THIS: Col. Coughlin gave Col. Emblanc a very much toned down version of what Bec actually said, though an entirely truthful one. BEC HAS VERY CAREFUL TO CALL ONLY COL. COUGHLIN IS A DISSENT AND TO WRITE ONLY TO COL. COUGHLIN, and never mention the fact that he spilled the beans to Col. Wight and Lt. Devereux. In fact, and without being asked, he spilled everything to Lt. Devereux and to Col. Wight, and there as it is technically correct that the text of his punishment order arose in saying that he had spilled the beans to a chief of an allied organization (by inference Col. Coughlin) whereas he spilled it to Devereux and to the Executive Officer of another U.S. organization, Col. Wight, the fact remains that he did NOT INFORM EMBLANC OF THE MARRING HE HAD RECEIVED, NOR OF THE FACT THAT COL. WIGHT HAD PHONED EDITH LEE (AS BEATED IN THE MAIN DOCUMENT.) IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT HE KNEW THAT COL. WIGHT TELEPHONED, HAVING BEEN PROMPT, THAT HE HAD BEEN SHOT TOO, SINCE DEVEREUX, PRESENT, TRANSLATED IT TO HIM, AND HAD TO GET HIM SOME DETAILS ON COL. WIGHT'S BEHALF. In brief, as regards the defense: He did not spill it to the "chief" of an allied organization, but to some officers of that group, and knew of an intervention by one of them.

He furthermore knew of facts which he was in duty bound to report, and to his commanding officers. This fact he carefully suppressed and lied all about it (let us remember) that he would leave that he passed through the "line" and said nothing to anyone. In my opinion at least, he certainly covered up the whole matter, that he had not been asked. It appears to me that he was not just lying, knowing that he told me (Emblanc) and Col. Wight. I call this act of mine a "very" bit of my own up to date of law, but not before Emblanc, coming from a punishment.

Personally I found Bec's defense in this matter reprehensible and have not

(b) It may be said against Col. Bablanc that he lost his temper and grossly violated military etiquette in reprimanding one of his officers before two allied officers and a French officer equal in rank to Sec. Also he spoke sharply and loudly. He acted like a man under the strain of final exasperation and provocation. It is also possible that Bablanc did overstate what Col. Coughlin actually said. Also the text of the punishment motivation was technically (NOT ONLY TECHNICALLY) wrong. But it should be remembered that he over-stated things (i.e. he did) in quoting Col. Coughlin, and reached that conclusion on the basis of the fact that in the meantime he had been notified that the Chinese forbade Sec to leave. (The fact is that Sec did spill things to Lt. Dervieux first, and to Cdr. Night next, that Cdr. Night phoned to Liu, and that Sec had been advised of Chinese intervention by the Chinese themselves.)

SEMIING UP:

(a) Col. Bablanc is guilty of:


- (a) Improper external form of reprimand.
- (b) Technical misstatements in wording the punishment.
- (c) Drawing inferences (CONJECTURE)
- (d) Losing his temper.
- (e) Not leading over backward to be fair to a man whom he dislikes.
- (f) *Not leading over backward to be fair to a man whom he dislikes.*

(b) Father Sec is guilty of:

- (a) Withholding relevant information from his superior officer.
- (b) Giving this information to allied officers.
- (c) Not protesting against the telephone call on his behalf.
- (d) Obviously counting upon Americans to get him out of the jam, and counting upon Dervieux keeping his mouth shut.
- (e) Needling Col. Bablanc into losing his temper.
- (f) Extreme insolence toward his commanding officer.
- (g) Statements which may stand up in court of law as truth, but which I, as an officer and gentleman, I hope, do not hesitate one moment in describing as
 - (a) A defense worthy of a cheap shopkeeper.
 - (b) A moral lie bespeaking an officer and gentleman...and a priest.

(NOTE: I am fully aware of the implications, for myself, of the statements I made with regard to Father Sec's honesty and I am prepared to tell him so to his face and face him to bring court martial charges against me. His performance was revealing astoundingly. I state upon my word that until that afternoon when Sec was confronted with Bablanc and Col. Coughlin I was impartial. From that afternoon on I refuse to consider Father Sec as a gentleman. He is 35 years old and has done a few things. I cannot remember anything that has revealed me as much. To explain how much I was shocked, I will state that when I say (a) a dog being elbowed to death, and (b) an anti-semitic riot in Berlin, which are two more or less shocking things I ever saw.)

UNRELIABLE: I repeat that up to the time of this scene I was impartial. I have done my best in keeping the above impartial, except for the last few lines. I don't say anything, in the future, of being impartial about Father Sec. I consider him an unprincipled scoundrel. Please note that I am not just personally prejudiced in this business. My impartiality is purely moral. He has stood there and lied, staring me in the face, knowing that I knew that he lied and was prepared from having me by military etiquette. I do not know what to call such behavior. I do know I felt sick to my stomach literally.



OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

Reynolds, J.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Spence

February 15, 1944

FROM: E. L. Moore, South East Asia AF Desk

SUBJECT: General Report, Chief of the French
Military Mission in Washington

1. General Report, Chief of the French Military Mission in Washington has sent word through this office that he will appreciate an appointment with General Spence, as soon as possible, after his arrival in Washington.
2. The purpose of this visit is an effort to establish a program of cooperation between the French and American military forces, regarding military and political matters. The program was discussed on 12 February 1944 and the French, 13 February 1944, may give some indication of the nature of the program.
3. The Colonel's conclusion is that the program will be highly appreciated by General Spence.

11/1/44

COPY

SECRET

Rev. 27 - 1941

SECRET**1. Information is being**

Confirmation has been received that the French military mission in London has been finally organized and is now working independently. In any event, the mission is now working independently.

The French group is now working independently. Information is being received.

2. Information is being

A French military mission has been organized and is now working independently. Information is being received.

3. French military mission

A fully organized mission has been organized and is now working independently. Information is being received.

Information on the mission is being received. Information is being received.

A most pressing matter is being received. Information is being received.

December 8, 1961

新華書店經售

SECRET

- [illegible]

100-443887-100

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

2. The second part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

3. The third part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

4. The fourth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

5. The fifth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

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10. The tenth part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

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- 2 -

and conversations, it is most urgently recommended by the French High Command that no military operations should be prepared or engaged on the Indo-China Theater without previous consultation.

The French High Command is presently in position to engage in Indo-China the important political action which appears necessary before any military action can be taken with success. It is thus more indicated that it is the stated intention of the French High Command that the political action can only be taken with successful results by the special French representation.

As regard to military operations, the French Command will of course accept and execute the plan of operations and instructions prepared by the Allied Command.

In order to coordinate properly the French and Allied action in the Far Eastern Theater, the French Government of Indochina National has entered diplomatic negotiations with the British and American Governments to obtain the necessary participation in the War Pacific Council, which would ensure that the scope of French interests and colonial possessions in the Far Eastern Theater.

INFORMATION

ROUTING SHEET

Trench Mission 10,539

SECRET

Subject: Report on Meynier Project

Originator: Major Hoffmann
 Date: Dec. 24, 1943
 Addressee: General Donovan
 Date Rec'd:

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Act'd		
Colonel Haxton	124	Admin.	6-15 PM	JCB	1/24/44
Mr. Cheston	Admin.				
Col. Boering	Admin.				
Lt. Dennis, PFTD	2174	Que		HA	
Mr. Geylmer	2108	Que		SUS	
Major Humphreys	2108	Que		WPA	
Mr. Davis	2108	Que		WPA	

General Meynier - 124 Central
 Gen. Donovan's files - Admin.

J. J. Putnam, Jr.
 13 January 1944

From File of the Directorate
 Please Return

*French Mission 10,539 P-
New Year Project
Hoffman, Carl*

December 24, 1943

General William J. Donovan, Director
Office of Strategic Services
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

Dear General,

A copy of the attached report was given to General Stilwell. He is most happy with the new OSS setup and delighted with Coughlin.

Fai Li is also in fine humor about Coughlin and the action that is taking place. I am making him happy with the little things, like a set of hand tools for trucks, vitamin pills, inquiries to my private connections on pipe line material for oil wells, etc. The foundation work is all laid, Coughlin's intelligence class of 25 students picked out of 350 starts next week. Hall should arrive in a day or two; same for Falkner. One building in the Valley is set aside for OSS personnel.

Coughlin and I go to Kunning in a few days to review the supply problem and attend to a few other "matters". I will explain these to you when I return. This picture has changed considerably since you left, but we tried to convert each disappointment into a favorable possibility. There is a tremendous job to do in recruiting, not so much in volume as in type. All recruiting in the field, with the exception of two or three men, failed, not for lack of cooperation from the army but for lack of availability of good men. We are "head over heels" with the army and the Air Corps, and they prefer we document none of the details and just send them the men. My Washington background has been most useful to me in this reorganization; the knowledge obtained from experience here and information gotten from Coughlin will be useful in getting the necessary job done in Washington.

Once Coughlin and I finish our work here and in Delhi, including some implementation of SACO from 101, there will be a three or four month's lull until personnel arrive here, get into the field, and set up communications. Coughlin has a good organizational action to do here. The initial plan and shovel work being done, there is beginning to hang heavy on my hands, but we are forced to stay here until the Christmas festivities are over so everybody's face will be saved and my head will ache.

The enclosed report addressed to Mr. Clayton is sent to him at his earliest request.

SECRET

Respectfully,

W. J. Donovan
W. J. Donovan
Director, OSS

French Mission 10,5396
 a Maynier project
 x Hoffmann, Carl

23 December 1943

SECRET

To: General William J. Donovan
 From: Major Carl O. Hoffmann

Subject: Maynier Project.

1. On December 10th Captain Miles received the following cable: "Regarding OSS handling groups under Stilwell your cable: 'Regarding OSS handling groups under Stilwell your 041430. Miles from Purnell. Our view is that Donovans plan is to our distinct advantage as separating politics from SAGO rather than injecting politics. State Department already complaining SAGO mixing in politics and complications such as their and French might readily lead them to demand termination whole project. For these reasons feel SAGO will be better off if political affairs are controlled by OSS under T C. Not quite clear in what theatre Donovan insists on Stilwell jurisdiction nor ever what activities."
2. On December 11th Miles replied as follows: "Your 071511. Donovan expressed his view to Hoffmann and me after interviews with Army and Ambassador. As a result of conferences Thailanders will be under guidance Hoffmann who is being indoctrinated with details. Today he ordered them to start moving. Eye agree. Miles to Purnell."
3. On December 10th Scribner cabled to General Donovan as follows: "J. M. Scribner to Donovan. (1) When Mary was in Africa, discussions were held with French concerning sharing of expenses Maynier Mission, which discussions have continued since group has arrived in field. Geminch sends. (2) On October 13th we proposed that pay and allowances be assured by French and customary arms, ammunition and communication equipment be furnished by U.S. Also, we were to defray expenses of housing and mess while group shared common quarters with P.S., and French assume if separated. (3) Prileger advised October 20th that in addition to above he had suggested to French he would assume fifty percent of joint operational expenses, exclusive of those aforementioned. This suggestion made by Prileger in accordance with conversations with Mary during letter's visit. (4) French have turned down Prileger's suggestion and present decision of French committee to assume responsibility for all operational expenses is apparently final. (5) We are advising you of this situation as we feel control is very likely to rest with party paying bills. We are further advised by Prileger that only manner in which committee may be persuaded to alter its decision is for you to discuss problem with DeGaulle. (6) Hoffmann knows background. Your advice requested."
4. On December 17th I cabled Scribner as follows: "Major Carl Hoffmann for Scribner. Your cable 071511 missed me (2. 10. 43."

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problem with Meynier group not pressing here. We will continue to support them until 109 considers problem raised by you and gives other orders. Group excellent and good results can be expected. This group and Thai group now in action and code name will be given them for security by separate cable."

5. On December 20th while I was at the Military Mission Gen. Stilwell sent for me. When I entered his office he had a letter from the French Mission which apparently dealt with the Meynier Mission, and with the request that it be kept free from Chinese domination. I had also heard prior to this time that the French had written General Tai Li to the effect that he should stop his agents from representing that they were associated with the French Mission. (The people in Indo-China according to the French Mission are quite Anti-Chinese). I advised General Stilwell that by an exchange of cables, OSS and Algiers were negotiating the procedural methods of operation, and that these might well result in the Meynier Project coming under French command with strong OSS liaison. Whatever the final result, I assured the General that we would take the position which would in no way embarrass him, as he had advised me that he wanted the help of the French and wanted no friction. I assured him that it was my opinion we could get along with the Free French very well no matter where technical command rested. I reported the entire new OSS setup and policies to General Stilwell, including the building up of our intelligence, and he seemed pleased.

6. On December 22nd we met Miles while we were walking up the Valley, and he advised that he had received a letter from Colonel Gubiane of the French Mission (Peckoff's executive officer) to the effect that he ordered Meynier back for a transportation. Miles suggested that Colonel Goughlin and I accompany him to the French Mission. Commander Wight, Miles' executive officer, was also in the group. We had a three-hour conference at the French Mission. Interpreters had to be used which explains the length of the conference. In substance the following was the position of the parties: Miles said he disagreed with calling Meynier back because his presence was needed in the field; that if there was an important message or messages they could be sent to Meynier by Gubiane over Miles' radio, or by post by a French officer, or possibly Gubiane could go in person. Miles also stated that he had an arrangement with Peckoff whereby Peckoff assigned the Meynier group to Miles for duty. This arrangement was an oral one.

Gubiane stated that he had no radio at his office and therefore he could not go to see Meynier, that what he had to say to Meynier could not be done over the radio as it required a code and was classified as psychological questions involving the army and the population of Indo-China. Gubiane took no

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position that it was vitally important that the French Mission and Meynier do not work at cross purposes and thereby jeopardize the entire Indo-China operations.

I could feel that Enblanc was holding something back. However, I sided with Mary on the proposition that Meynier should be left in the field. I felt that if he were brought back the political situation would become complicated. I had the very definite feeling that it would be a mistake for us to irritate the French Mission, who admitted quite frankly they were quite helpless in China. I had the feeling that the whole mission could be converted into an OSS project if we handled ourselves correctly. Irrespective of what their personal feelings may be they need our help in manpower and equipment, and they would probably "bid high" to get it. On the other hand, they also wanted to be sure that we would not use our influence over them to permit the Chinese to dominate them. With all these reactions in mind I suggested Enblanc delay his cable to Meynier. He then volunteered he had already sent his orders to Meynier, but would advise him to stand by for further instructions. At the end of the conference I suggested that we meet soon again. I felt they were somewhat irritated at having difficulties with the Americans as well as the Chinese.

7. December 23rd we were instructed to be at the U.S. Military Mission at 10 o'clock. Colonel Coughlin and I met Colonel Enblanc. This meeting was arranged by Colonel Dickie of G-2 under orders of General Stilwell to get OSS and the French Mission together for a discussion. Following so closely on our earlier conference and not having been arranged by either Colonel Coughlin or myself, it was a fortunate happenstance. I opened the discussion by explaining the circumstances of the meeting and told Colonel Enblanc that I was not satisfied with yesterday's discussion because I felt there were mental reservations on both sides. I told him that I gathered that he objected to operating the Meynier group under the present circumstances and wanted command, and assured him that if that were the case he need not fear American resentment as we always recognize the sovereignty of other Nations, but that we insisted on staying out of politics, that I was quite sure he did not object to the American command, but was concerned over the Chinese influence. I also pointed out to him that his own present predicament was quite evident to him that without "Chinese assistance" it is impossible to accomplish a great deal in China. I asked him to make his position quite clear and we would do all we could to cooperate. He then admitted that he had received formal orders from Algiers, ordering him to take over the Meynier Mission, but that he hesitated to do so the day before because of the apparent tension of the meeting. I assured him that we would respect that order as he certainly must, and as far as OSS was concerned we ask only strong liaison and "sit-in" by communication or otherwise, that we would like to work with the Mission in its entirety. He seemed very pleased with this attitude, and in order to clarify the situation I told him on the basis of

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Serisier's cable) he could consider that matter closed as between Algiers and Washington, but that so far as the Chinese was concerned the French Mission and the Chinese would have to work out their own solution, and until the French advised us that they have worked out a "divorce" with the Chinese we would consider the matter in status quo. Colonel Anblanc seemed tremendously pleased and said "merci, merci!". I knew that I had already cabled Washington that I would wait for General Donovan's further orders. I also knew that this was a chance for a gamble. Having made the gamble with my fingers crossed, you can imagine how delighted I was when Anblanc turned to his Aide and asked for his brief-case, and then presented to the meeting a complete intelligence report with photostatic copies of maps, both pertaining to Thailand and Indo-China, and advised that weather reports on day and night conditions would be handed over to the Army forty minutes after completed. An economic map Indo-China was likewise made available. The French were advised that Colonel Coughlin had full authority to act for OSS, and that I was acting as Gen. Donovan's representative. It is arranged that publications coming out of Indo-China go to Kates, and Coughlin through his experience will make known to Kates which publications he needs from a military standpoint. The flow of publications from Indo-China is quite free. Kates had already tapped this source to the extent of his interest.

Carl Hoffmann
Major Carl C. Hoffmann

SECRET

COPY

SECRET

24 December 1943

To: Mr. Tanton
 From: Major Carl C. Hoffmann

Subject: Report on Rubin and Moss.

1. The following was given to me by Captain Miles, who got his information from one McCleary, Naval Liaison Officer at Bombay.

2. Two men, Rubin and Moss, in Merchant Marine uniforms with Seaman Certificates advised McCleary that they were instructed by one Mr. Luby to leave India when they arrived at Bombay. Their mission was to find out how information leaks are handled at Bombay. McCleary asked them about the ship and the men was unable to give me any further information. Both men were apparently completely indiscreet. I regret that I have more information I can give you.

cc/ Carl C. Hoffmann
 Major, A.G.I.



First National
Bank
National Church

April 2, 1963

Mr. J. Edgar Hoover
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Hoover:

I have received your letter of April 1, 1963, and am sorry to hear that it was not received in time for the meeting of our representatives in Washington. We have no other contact with the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I think it is very important that we should have a meeting with you.

Very respectfully,
John F. Kennedy

MISSION MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE
DIRECTION DES SERVICES CIVILS

T-Rend Mission 16, 5-37A
v. M. n. r.
x. Judo China

No 322 /AC

WASHINGTON, LE 5 avril,

1943.

Cher Général Doreux,

Je viens de recevoir un télégramme d'Alger indiquant que la date de mise en route du Commandant Maynier n'est toujours pas fixée.

Les autorités nord-africaines insistent pour que la priorité nécessaire soit délivrée le plus tôt possible à cet officier, étant donné l'intérêt pressant des prises de contact qu'il doit effectuer à Washington.

Me référant à sa lettre du 22 mars dernier, je vous prie très respectueusement de vous vouloir intervenir dans ce sens auprès des services compétents.

Très affectueux salutations,
l'assurance de mes sentiments très dévoués.

Ass. M. n. r.
Ministre Plénipotentiaire
Directeur des Services Civils

M. le Général William Doreux,
Office of Air Corps Services,
1425 & E. 27th St.,
Washington,
D.C.

MILITAIRE FRANÇAISE
DES SERVICES CIVILS

French Mission 10559 A
X Truy, Commandant
X Indo-China

No 150 AC

WASHINGTON, LE 22 MARS,

1943.

Cher Colonel Donovan,

En réponse à notre entretien du 15 mars dernier, je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que je viens de recevoir un télégramme d'Alger m'informant que toutes les dispositions nécessaires ont été prises en vue du départ immédiat du Commandant Reynier.

Les autorités françaises expriment le désir que des instructions soient données par vous au Colonel Rotté afin de permettre au Commandant Reynier d'obtenir sans délai une place sur avion./.

Veuillez agréer, cher Colonel Donovan, l'assurance de nos sentiments très distingués.

H. H. H. H.

Colonel Rotté, Commandant
Service des Services Civils

Colonel Rotté, Commandant
Service des Services Civils
2301 & 1501, 1501
1501, 1501, 1501
1501, 1501, 1501

MISSION

DIRECTION

THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION
WASHINGTONRoom 3535 - Munitions Building
Rm. 6706
Ext. 76458Meynier, Comd. No. 179
x 1-500-1-10000
x Indo-China

Le 15 mars 1943.

No /AC

THE MISSION

La Mission Militaire Française d'Afrique a l'honneur de faire connaître à l'Office of Strategic Services que le General Giraud dispose à Alger des collaborations nécessaires pour organiser une mission spéciale destinée à travailler en Indochine dans le sens indiqué par le Colonel Beauvan en cours des conversations qu'il a eues avec le General Bethouart le 16 février et avec M. Georges-Picot le 17 février.

Le Chef de la Mission serait un officier de marine, le Commandant Meynier, commandant du sous-marin "Glorieux" échappé de Toulon le 27 novembre, qui est un spécialiste de l'Indochine.

La Mission Militaire Française serait rattachée à l'O.S.S. de bien vouloir lui confirmer son désir de voir le Commandant Meynier venir à Washington avant son départ pour la Chine, qui ne pourra avoir lieu avant deux semaines.

62/57

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DATE: March 23, 1945
FROM:

TO: DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

SUBJECT:

Handwritten:
Jace 096

SECRET**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.***French Mission 4534*
*X Encls. 001a**X Miles, Capt. M.E.*
X Bethouart, Gen.
X Heynier, Commandant.

March 26th, 1943

MEMORANDUMTO: General Donovan
FROM: R. Davis Halliwell

With reference to the conversations you have had with General Bethouart and in relation to his Aide Memoire of March 15th.

Captain Miles has been consulted as to what he believes is the most practicable schedule and I enclose a copy of his memorandum under date of March 15th wherein you will observe that the Captain suggests that a meeting be arranged in North Africa.

It is my recollection that Commander Heynier is already on his way to this country.

Will you, therefore, please let us have your guidance in order that this matter may move smoothly.

SECRET

12 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. C. W. BILBING

SUBJECT: Frank Martin for Assassination

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of a small amount of information regarding the activities of Frank Martin in the period of investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This information is being furnished to you for your information.

2. I understand that a memorandum dated 12 March 1953, was submitted to you by the Special Agent in Charge, New York, in which it was stated that...

3. I am not aware of any other information regarding Martin's activities in the period of investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It is noted that Martin was in New York City on 22 October 1962, and that he was seen by a person who was identified as a person who was known to Martin. It is also noted that Martin was seen by a person who was identified as a person who was known to Martin on 22 October 1962.

4. It is noted that Martin was seen by a person who was identified as a person who was known to Martin on 22 October 1962. It is also noted that Martin was seen by a person who was identified as a person who was known to Martin on 22 October 1962.

5. It is noted that Martin was seen by a person who was identified as a person who was known to Martin on 22 October 1962. It is also noted that Martin was seen by a person who was identified as a person who was known to Martin on 22 October 1962.

SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

French Mission
X Under Chief
X French
X Officers

M.F. 34

March 1, 1943

Memorandum to Colonel Donovan
 From: F. Davis Halliwell

With reference to Captain Miles' request for French officers for use in IG which is a part of the long report brought back by Mr. Luby a communication along these lines has been sent to our friends:

Your Project General Bethouart French Representative here has requested General Girard to select competent officers for us handling affair secretly through me. Donovan.

[Handwritten signature]

SECRETOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.* French
* Indo China
* Far East
* Diggins

February 27, 1943

Memorandum

To: Mr. Murphy

From: R. Davis Halliwell

Before Colonel Donovan got the idea of working with the higher French echelon in this country Mr. Poole had made a list of suggestions to help in filling Captain Miles' request.

If our French military friends fell down, Mr. Poole has given us quite a number of names that we could look into and I thought you might like to know that we have some data on these people here in the Branch.

French Mission 10639
K. French - Chairman
X Officers
X French

February 16, 1949

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
From: Colonel Donovan
To: Lt. Col. Holliswell

I have talked to General Rothman about
the Indo-China matter and he is communicating with
General Girard to see if competent officers could
not be sent to do this work.

SECRET

Copy of portion of Captain Miles'
letter of Dec. 11st re Indo-China

ANNEX "C"

INDO-CHINA FRONT: Darlan's assassination is rather an awkward blow to us at this time, in this theater.

There are approximately 50,000 troops under the command of the French in Indo-China. The number of these that are native troops is not known to me. Civilians of French extraction are probably around 40,000 a great deal of whom are in the government services. Of the civilians, it is estimated that about 65 are pro-Japanese, 20% are on the fence, and the remainder are anti-Japanese. The troops are well under the control of the French officers. They are considered to be anti-axis, anti-Vichy, and anti-deGaulle. They are on the side of the troops actually fighting with the United Nations in North Africa, although they are a bit confused at present. It is positively known that they are anti-deGaulle. 85 to 95% of all French in Indo-China would definitely desire a United Nations victory, but are not going to stick their necks out at present to help that victory. Some of this attitude is caused by the influence of government employees who are looking forward to retirement and pensions and life as usual. Because of this attitude, the Japanese have been able to continue the rather liberal system of government by the French themselves and have recently been able to shift a considerable number of Nip troops out of Indo-China, to meet the impending attacks in Burma. If the French troops in Indo-China could be stiffened in their attitudes against the present Indo-China regime the Japanese would have to divert their attention toward this area more. It would be extremely embarrassing to them at this time. Because of deGaulle's representation in the Far East being ineffectual in this situation we should take immediate steps to remedy the situation. There has been in Chungking for about months a delegation of deGaulleists who have accomplished nothing. One week before Darlan's death they brought to General Tai a proposal which was nothing in its denunciation of Darlan. Although it was anti-axis it showed definitely that they were trying to stir up help in China for deGaulle.

I have discussed these matters several times and at some length with General Tai. He believes that it would be advisable and highly useful to import some special new blood into the situation here. It is recommended that the French now fighting in North Africa on the side of the United Nations be requested to select two or three competent officers to come to Chungking to assist in stirring up the situation in Indo-China. Their qualifications should be as near as possible as follows:

1. Definitely anti-axis.
2. Anti-Vichy, but not deGaulle supporters.
3. Pro-United Nations and especially friendly to China, and the United States.

SECRET

- 2 -

4. Personally known to the leaders of the French troops in Indo-China and be of such caliber and standing as to have considerable influence on these leaders.
5. Be willing to work with and cooperate with SACO.

If such qualifications can be met in the very near future the aid that can be furnished Stikrell in Burma will be substantial. Future dividends will increase on the outlay. If such persons can be found they should be sent to Chungking in the utmost secrecy, without reference to the French Embassy, and without passing through Colston. They will be taken to the Indo-China border and smuggled across to the other side after contacting their friends there.

... working on the idea of starting a smuggling industry to get rubber out of Indo-China. More frequent photo-reconnaissance is necessary in this theater in connection with sabotage of the rice, rubber, and metals supply to Japan, as well as to obtain ordinary intelligence information.

[illegible]

SECRET

1. The purpose of this document is to provide information regarding the activities of the [redacted] in the [redacted] area. The information is being provided for your information and is not to be used for any other purpose.

100-443887-100

100-443887-100

4. The investigation conducted since the time the subject was admitted to prison only the investigation of the subject's behavior to prevent any further escape attempts. The investigation of the subject's behavior is being conducted by the FBI and the State Police.

3. It was found that the... which they are willing to... the American who... place within and... groups with a greater... each year -... investigation center... the State... the... the... of... the... of...

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

Bundy answered us that their desire to use French pilots had been "Nationalistic" about it. They had nothing but praise for the English pilots and quite understood the Air Ministry's insistence upon the great possible margin of safety. However, the French would like to be in a position not to be a prisoner to the their own judge of the degree of risk with a given operative jet-fighter. In some cases where a particularly important person (or lot or communication) in the planning of which they themselves have been placed) was to be picked up, the running of a high speed jet might be justified. In other cases the operation might involve the running of only a small degree of risk. The Air Ministry is not to be blamed upon the great safety margin in all cases. However, in the event of a crash, a French pilot had a much better chance of getting away (as was not killed) than did an English pilot.

[illegible][illegible]

2000

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THE

that with the proper administration of the program, it
will result in a more efficient and more effective
use of the resources of the government and the people.
The program will be administered by the Department of
the Interior, and the results will be reported to the
President.

Washington, September 24, 1954

Mr. [Name] [Address]
[City] [State] [Zip]
Dear Mr. [Name]:
I am pleased to hear that you are interested in
the program of the Department of the Interior.
The program is designed to provide for the
conservation of the natural resources of the
United States, and to provide for the
development of the resources of the United States.
The program is administered by the Department of
the Interior, and the results will be reported to
the President.

Sincerely,
[Signature]
[Name]
[Title]
[Department]
[Address]
[City] [State] [Zip]

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1130 HOWARD BLVD.
4TH FLOOR, SPRING STREET

LOS ANGELES 19, CALIFORNIA

July 10, 1945

Mr. Charles C. Cheston
Office of Strategic Services
25th & E Streets, NW
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Cheston:

General Henri Ziegler, Commandant Savy-Millet and party arrived in Los Angeles this past week. We were asked to be of some assistance in making their stay in Southern California a little more pleasant. The writer arranged matters so that on Sunday, July 8th, Mr. Atwater Kent of this city gave a cocktail party lasting from 6:00 until 9:00 PM, at which General Ziegler and his associates had the opportunity of meeting many of the people prominent in this community. There were approximately 75 guests present, and I am certain that our guests were very appreciative of the entertainment afforded them. I have written Mr. Kent a letter expressing our thanks to him.

On Saturday, July 7th, the writer entertained General Ziegler and Commandant Millet at a smaller affair, but one which they both seemed to enjoy. They have been profuse in their expressions of appreciation.

Very truly yours,

M. N. Easton

MNE:im
cc Col. Connelley-SF

MARTIN N. EASTON, in Charge
Los Angeles Office

Mrs. O'Donnell

Mr. J. D. Smith

enc

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U.S. DEPT. OF STATE
 (Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards)

Mr. Tolson
 Mr. Clegg
 Mr. Glavin
 Mr. Ladd
 Mr. Nichols
 Mr. Rosen
 Mr. Tracy
 Mr. Carson
 Mr. Egan
 Mr. Gurnea
 Mr. Harbo
 Mr. Hendon
 Mr. Pennington
 Mr. Quinn
 Mr. Nease
 Miss Gandy

5/19/41

1. For information of the Department

147-760

2 8

CARRIAGE LETTER HQ OSS BTGUSA
Just remain with attached papers

TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT: Transmittal of Background Information on File No: General Ziegler and Cmdt. Savy
Colonel B. F. Rushie Director SOI Div.	Lt. Col. R. I. Powell Chief, SOI Div.	9 June 47	1. Forwarded, recommending transmittal to Mr. Cheston. <i>R. I. Powell</i> R. I. POWELL Lt. Col., Cav. Chief, SOI Div.

CONFIDENTIAL

HQ & HQ DEPARTMENT
Office of Strategic Services
European Theater of Operations
UNITED STATES ARMY
(forward)

15, 400-0
French Mission
J. J. J. J.
M. J. J. J.

APO 887

9 June 1945

SUBJECT: General Hiegler, alias Vernon, and Commandant Gavy, alias
Hillet.

TO : Colonel E. R. Gable, Director OSS, Paris.
FROM : Lieutenant-Colonel E. L. Powell, Chief, SO Pwd.

1. With reference to your recent cable to Mr. Chetani it occurs to me that you may wish to forward to him the following information giving some additional information on the background and activities of General Hiegler and Commandant Gavy.

LINCOLN - was Colonel of the French Air Force and left for Algeria in March 1943 by submarine. (General de Gaulle having requested him to head his position he returned to the southern part of France where he organized resistance. He left for England in December 1944 and in June 1945 was one of the 1500 men of the new staff under General Koenig with Colonel van der Grinten and a British Colonel. Both were captured by German soldiers and a staff of the new staff. General van der Grinten then became the commander and was the senior American representative. General Hiegler is an officer of the French Air Force. He is head of the Air Mission which is a visit American aircraft industries for the purpose of acquiring parts and licenses for rebuilding French aircraft.

GAVY - one of the most prominent figures in the French Air Force. He was captured by German soldiers in June 1944 and was held in a prison in Germany. He was released in June 1945 and was one of the 1500 men of the new staff under General Koenig. He was captured by German soldiers and was held in a prison in Germany. He was released in June 1945 and was one of the 1500 men of the new staff under General Koenig.

CONFIDENTIAL

to the Gestapo and, in July 1943, he left France for England where he became affiliated with Special Force Headquarters.

The wealth of knowledge of underground activities and possibilities which Major Gavy had acquired in the years since the occupation of France by the Germans proved of invaluable assistance to SFE in the preparation and execution of plans for the most effective utilization of Resistance forces in France.

In February 1944, Major Gavy volunteered to return to France for the purpose of laying the necessary groundwork in connection with the Tripartite Jod-Burg Plan.

Major Gavy volunteered for this mission with the full knowledge that due to an obvious physical defect (a shrunk arm) it would be a simple matter for the Gestapo to recognize him as the man they were looking for because of his previous underground activities and, should he be captured, he would be treated as a spy with death by torture resulting.

On 2 March 1944, Major Gavy, accompanied by a radio operator, left England by sea for France. Upon his arrival he immediately went to Paris where he had been well known in civil life before the war. In spite of the ever present danger of collaboration and Gestapo agents posing as loyal Frenchmen, Major Gavy came into contact with Resistance leaders and during the setting of the machinery in motion for the carrying out of over one hundred groups of Resistance personnel prepared to receive foreign troops, radio houses were established in areas specified, all of which were chosen to be in the center of the city, and station reception facilities for the use of the landing groups were designated.

His work in Paris continued until Major Gavy was captured throughout the entire period of his stay in France. The various German papers, and especially the Parisian press, carried all of the news of his capture and the subsequent execution of the plan for the landing of the first group of foreign troops.

In one month's time, Major Gavy had accomplished his mission and returned to England with a complete and detailed report on the strength and armament of Resistance in France as well as the strength and disposition of German troops and installations.

He was Colonel Ziegler's Chief Assistant at HAFI and had been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Paul Rosenberg file
13. R. DU NOUVEAU DE SAINTE

